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OPTIONS BACKDATING: A CANADIAN PERSPECTIVE 
—  Ryan Compton, Daniel Sandler, Lindsay Tedds 
 
Abstract 
 
 
This paper provides an overview of (1) the basics of employee stock option backdating; (2) why 
firms and individuals may engage in backdating; (3) the difficulties in examining option 
backdating in Canada as well as a Canadian case study of option backdating; (4) implications of 
backdating; and (5) suggestions for curbing the potential to backdate in Canada.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There has been a recent surge in popular interest and academic research regarding executive 
compensation that has been stimulated by both the escalation in the size of executive 
compensation, as well as the increasing array of components in executive compensation.
1
  
Generally, there are five components to most executive remuneration packages: annual salary, 
annual bonus, stock options, long-term incentive plans, and fringe benefits (e.g. pensions, car 
and possibly chauffeur, and club memberships).  The intent of each is to tie compensation to 
either short or long-term company performance as well as to attract and retain key executives. 
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While all of these components have been growing over time, the use of stock options has 
experienced the greatest increase over the last 20 years.  Stock options have become the single 
largest component of compensation among CEO‘s at large publicly traded companies in North 
America.
2
 In 1991, 33 percent of the largest one hundred Canadian public corporations granted 
stock options to their executives;
3
 by 1999, this number had increased to 97 percent
4
 and by 2000 
was 100 percent.
5
   
 
There are four key reasons for the increasing use of stock options in executive compensation 
packages.
6
  The first relates to the classic economic principal-agent problem of aligning the 
incentives of managers with shareholders.  The share price of a company should be positively 
related to the financial performance of the company, and since executive stock options become 
more valuable the higher the stock price, options granted to executives should provide incentive 
for executives to maximize company performance and thus share price.  Not surprisingly, 
shareholders have increasingly come to prefer a larger proportion of stock options in relation to 
base salary in executive compensation packages.  Second, executives too have come to prefer 
this form of compensation, likely because the ―…overwhelming majority of stock options issued 
since 1980 have been exercised well in-the-money….‖7  The existence of this long-standing 
―bull market‖ (at least until late 2008) means that executives have seen their stock prices rise 
regardless of their individual or collective managerial acumen.  Third, until recently, firms did 
not generally have to recognize a compensation expense when stock options were granted not-in-
the-money.
8,9
  As a result, firms that prefer stock options to cash compensation report higher net 
income.  Finally, executives can also benefit from the preferential tax treatment – both deferral 
and a preferential tax rate – for the income earned from executive stock options.  For example, in 
 3 
Canada, the receipt of executive stock options do not give rise to a tax liability until at least the 
time that the options are exercised and perhaps not until the underlying shares are sold.  And, 
assuming the options are granted not-in-the-money, the stock option benefit – the difference 
between the fair market value of the shares at the time of exercise and the exercise price – is 
taxed similar to capital gains rather than employment income, where capital gains are effectively 
taxed at one-half the rate of employment income. 
 
While executive stock options have gained prominence as a compensation and incentive 
mechanism, recent work in the U.S. has raised concerns about stock options as a major 
component of executive compensation.  These concerns surround the practice of backdating and 
overall corporate governance.
10
 Backdating is the act of using hindsight to select a date for a 
stock option grant after that date has occurred, and then claiming to have granted the options on 
that earlier date, in order to take advantage of the historical price performance of a company‘s 
stock. In practice this would involve looking back to find a local low point for the underlying 
stock relative to the current day‘s stock price and choosing that low point as the option‘s grant 
date. For example, at a June 30 meeting, an executive/compensation committee might look back 
and find the stock traded at its lowest in the month on June 24. The executive stock options 
approved by the executive/compensation committee at the June 30 meeting are indicated in the 
accompanying paperwork as having been granted on June 24 with the exercise price 
corresponding to the monthly low of the stock price, even though the actual grant occurred on 
June 30.   Under this practice of manipulating public filings, executive stock options are reported 
as being granted not-in-the-money on the date the share was trading at its lowest (June 24); 
however, given that the actual date the decision is made and options are awarded (June 30) is 
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after that earlier date and the stock price on June 30 is higher than the option exercise price 
(equal to the trading price on June 24), the options are, in reality, granted in-the-money.  
 
The practice of option backdating as a possible explanation for abnormal stock return patterns 
surrounding reported option grant dates was first suggested by Erik Lie in 2005.
11
  Lie‘s seminal 
study examined approximately 6,000 CEO option grants reported between 1992 and 2002 by 
publicly traded companies in the U.S. and found that stock returns were unusually low prior to 
the granting of executive stock options but then rebounded rather sharply following the granting 
of the option.  While some may argue this is coincidence or perhaps even evidence of impressive 
forecasting ability by these companies, the result raised concerns in the U.S. among regulators 
and shareholders alike.  Shortly after Lie‘s study became public, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) launched a broad probe of option granting, with a specific focus on 
backdating.  Since then close to 200 companies have been investigated by the SEC and the U.S. 
Justice Department, many companies have had to restate earnings, a number of company 
executives have been forced to resign after admitting to backdating options, and criminal 
investigations have been launched against several key insiders.  Since Lie‘s study, dozens of 
studies using U.S. data have been conducted that generally support Lie‘s finding.12 
 
In stark contrast to the U.S. research, studies of option backdating in Canada are absent. This 
void is likely not reflective of the lack of backdating or option timing in Canada. For example, 
Siskinds LLP, a Canadian law firm specializing in class actions, has investigated stock option 
awards of a number of companies trading on the TSX has found evidence of backdating 
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behaviour or other stock option manipulation in 35 companies, and is investigating suspicious 
behaviour in 25 others.
13
   
 
This paper has four goals. Focusing solely on Canadian publicly traded companies, the practice 
of backdating is explained in detail, as is the motivation to engage in backdating. Second, we 
demonstrate the manner in which option timing of Canadian corporations can be analyzed. Third, 
the tax, accounting, legal and policy issues that arise due to backdating are discussed. Finally we 
provide recommendations for constraining the practice of backdating.  
 
2. What is Backdating? 
 
As stated earlier, backdating is the act of using hindsight to select a particular date for a stock 
option grant after the particular date has passed, and then claiming to have granted the options 
on that particular date, in order to take advantage of the historical price performance of a 
company‘s stock. The primary motivation for backdating is to increase the benefit to the 
employee (either realized or potential) that arises from the stock option.  
 
Backdating can be difficult to identify. In examining backdating, it is important to understand the 
importance of the ―filing window‖. In Canada, insiders are required to report to the appropriate 
securities regulator the granting of an option within 10 calendar days of the award of the 
option.
14
 With 10 calendar days to report an option, this in essence provides a ―window of 
opportunity‖ to backdate, as those insiders who determine (or can influence) when options are 
granted could continually look back over the previous 10 days for a low point in the share‘s 
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price, select that low point as the option grant date, claim to have actually granted the option on 
that date, and still file on time.
15
  Adding further complexity to this problem (in terms of 
detection) is that options may not be granted at the lowest price in the filing window (but the 
second or third lowest price) in order to camouflage backdating activity.
16
  Moreover, it is not 
uncommon to find grants reported months or even years after they were apparently awarded.  
Late reporting provides an extremely large window to look back through for the purpose of 
backdating. 
 
With this understanding, we present in Figure 1 two examples from Canadian option filings of 
behaviour that appears to be consistent with backdating.
17
  Both the grant date and the date the 
option award was reported to the appropriate securities body are noted in the figure. In both 
cases the option grant date accorded with a local low point in the company‘s share price within a 
30-day window.  The graph on the left presents the pattern that is most identifiable in the 
backdating literature.  In this case, the company‘s stock price was falling in the days leading up 
to the date the options were awarded and rose immediately afterward; the grant of the options 
was reported after the share price appeared to have stabilized at the higher level.  The graph on 
the right presents a less identifiable pattern.  In this case the company‘s stock price was generally 
rising over the entire period shown but, given that securities regulations require that option 
award be reported within 10 calendar days, it is clear that the stock option was awarded on the 
local low point within the ten calendar day filing (look back) window.
18
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Figure 1: Examples Consistent with Backdating 
 
 
  
 
Consider the actual mechanics behind the act of backdating, particularly with the amount of 
oversight that is in place in many corporations.  Three possible examples, each increasing in 
intentional wrongdoing, are outlined here and other examples are outlined in papers by 
Yermack
19
 and by Chauvin and Shenoy.
20
  The first is to establish a practice in which the grant 
date for option awards is automatically set to the lowest trading price within an established 
window (e.g. the month in which the option was awarded, or the month preceding the grant of 
the option).  The second is to declare a stock option award at a board meeting and the exercise 
price is set at a subsequent meeting, using the benefit of hindsight to set the price according to 
the lowest level at which the stock performed between the two dates.  The third is to substitute 
the actual date that the options are awarded at a board meeting, usually without the knowledge of 
the board members, with a different date when the stock price is lower.  This usually also 
requires that various corporate documents, such as Board and committee minutes, are falsified to 
misrepresent the actual dates of the related meetings and the associated option grants.  
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In terms of the question of the legality of backdating, as pointed out by Erik Lie, in the case of 
the U.S., backdating is not necessarily illegal if certain conditions are met.
21
 First, documents 
must not have been falsified. For example, minutes of meetings and the documents surrounding 
the granting of the option must properly reflect the actual date the option was approved and was 
granted. Second, companies must communicate to their shareholders that backdating is occurring 
when executive stock options are granted in-the-money based on using prior price information to 
set the option exercise price. Third, backdating options to grant them in-the-money must be 
reflected in the company‘s statement of earnings as well as accurately stated for tax purposes. As 
Lie points out, these conditions are seldom met, making the act of backdating often illegal. While 
clearly these conditions might also be met in the case of companies listed in Canada, one area 
where the U.S. and Canada differ is in the requirements of their respective stock exchanges, as 
noted in the next section.   
 
3. Canadian Institutional Context 
 
This section details some of the rules, regulations, and requirements surrounding executive 
option awards and their reporting in Canada. In addition to securities law requirements, all 
security based compensation arrangements, including employee stock option plans, of companies 
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) must comply with section 613 of the TSX 
Company Manual.
22
  All such plans, both when instituted and when amended, must be approved 
by a majority of the directors and, in most cases, also by shareholders,
23
 and must be filed with 
the TSX.
24
  Security holders must be informed annually of the terms of security based 
compensation
25
 and stock option grants must be reported to the TSX monthly.
26
  The TSX 
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requires that stock options must be granted not-in-the-money.
27
  Specifically, section 613(h)(i) 
states that ―the exercise price for any stock options granted under a security based compensation 
arrangement or otherwise must not be lower than the market price of the securities at the time the 
option is granted.‖ Granting stock options in-the-money, even if disclosed to shareholders, does 
not meet the exchange‘s requirements. Further, the option exercise price must not be based on 
undisclosed information relevant for the price of the stock.
28
   
 
In addition, Canadian securities regulators require that all insider option grants be reported on the 
System for Electronic Disclosure by Insiders (SEDI).
29
  Since December 14, 1999, Ontario 
securities legislation has required insider trading information to be filed with the Ontario 
Securities Commission within 10 calendar days of the option grant.
30
  Previously, such a report 
was not required to be filed until 10 days following the end of the month in which the option was 
granted.   Late reporting, if noticed by regulators, results in a fine of $50 per day up to a 
maximum of $1,000 per firm.   
 
4. What are the Benefits of Backdating? 
 
In this section we consider in turn, tax and accounting benefits to firms and their managers from 
backdating. 
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4.1 Tax Treatment – Employer 
 
There have been several studies in the U.S. that explicitly blame the U.S. tax code – specifically, 
section 162(m) of the Internal Revenue Code (Code) – for the backdating scandal.31  Until 1993 
corporations could deduct compensation to employees as an ordinary business expense, provided 
the amount was reasonable.
32
  In 1993, section 162(m) was introduced, which limits deductable 
compensation to $1 million annually for each of a company‘s CEO and the next four highest paid 
executives.  However, the limitation does not apply to some types of compensation, particularly 
performance-based compensation, such as stock options, providing key requirements are met.  In 
particular, stock options must be granted not-in-the-money.  Some have argued that section 
162(m) is not only directly to blame for the dramatic rise in the use of stock options in executive 
compensation packages but also for the backdating scandal.  The key argument here is that 
backdated stock option awards have the illusion of meeting the limitation exclusion whereas in 
reality the options are in-the-money and therefore subject to the limitation.  That is, backdating 
(if it is not detected) circumvents section 162(m).  However, there is no similar provision to 
section 162(m) in the Canada‘s Income Tax Act; Canadian firms have never been explicitly 
limited in the amount of executive compensation that is deductible (subject to a ―reasonableness‖ 
requirement similar to that in U.S.
33
).  This leads to the observation that there is no tax advantage 
to Canadian corporations engaging in backdating. Since stock options are not deductible for tax 
purposes in Canada, firms could face a higher effective tax rate than they would if they 
substituted stock option awards with cash payments (assuming that the firm is otherwise 
profitable).  This implies that Canadian firms face a trade-off between reporting higher net 
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income with increased tax payments when granting options, a trade-off not necessarily faced by 
firms in the U.S. 
 
4.2 Tax Treatment – Employee  
 
There may well be tax reasons for backdating in Canada, but they are related to the tax treatment 
of employee (including executive) recipients of the options rather than the corporate grantor.  
Although one is generally hard-pressed to find examples where the Canadian tax treatment of 
individuals is more generous than that in the U.S., one such example is the tax treatment of 
employee stock options. Sandler provides a detailed comparison of the tax treatment of employee 
stock options in the U.S. and Canada.
34
  What is particularly relevant for our discussion is that 
options granted not-in-the-money in Canada are given preferential tax treatment when compared 
to the taxation of options granted in-the-money and other employment income such as salary and 
cash bonuses.   
 
The provisions of the Income Tax Act applicable to the treatment of employee stock options of 
publicly traded companies are section 7 and paragraph 110(1)(d).  Under section 7, the amount 
of the stock option benefit – the difference between the fair market value of the shares at the time 
the options are exercised and the strike price under the options – is generally included in the 
employee‘s income in the year the options are exercised.  However, if certain conditions are met, 
the inclusion of this benefit may be deferred until the year that the shares are sold.  For options of 
publicly-traded companies, the deferral to the year the shares are sold applies only if the 
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conditions set out in paragraph 110(1)(d) are met and only up to a maximum of $100,000 worth 
of options per year.   
 
Under paragraph 110(1)(d), the employee is entitled to a deduction in determining taxable 
income equal to one-half of the benefit included in income under section 7 (in the year the 
options are exercised or the year the shares are sold, as the case may be) if three conditions are 
met:  the stock options are granted not-in-the-money, the employee deals at arm‘s length with the 
employer, and the shares acquired under the options are ―garden variety‖ common shares.  If the 
shares are sold for an amount exceeding the option exercise price, the employee also realizes a 
capital gain equal to the difference between the sale price of the shares and the fair market value 
of the shares on the exercise date; assuming that the shares acquired are considered capital 
property (which is likely to be the case), the employee‘s taxable capital gain is one-half of such 
capital gain.
35
 
 
Thus, employee stock options granted not-in-the-money are taxed at the same effective rate as 
capital gains.
36
  Furthermore, and contrary to the treatment of employee stock options in the 
U.S., the deduction under paragraph 110(1)(d) applies regardless of the total value of the options 
received and regardless of the length of time before sale that the shares are held after the exercise 
of the options.
37
 Hence, in Canada, the most preferential compensation regime from an 
employee‘s tax perspective is one where options are granted not-in-the-money (or for our 
purposes, backdated to appear as such).   
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4.3 Accounting Treatment  
 
Historically, the accounting principles governing the reporting of employee stock options were 
quite simplistic. Until recently, Canadian and U.S. firms did not have to recognize a 
compensation expense for stock options that were granted not-in-the-money and were not 
performance-based
38
 because the options could be accounted for using the intrinsic value 
method.
39
  The intrinsic value of a stock option is the amount by which the price of the 
underlying stock exceeds the exercise price at the grant date.  Provided that the option was 
granted not-in-the-money, it had no intrinsic value. When options were granted in-the-money, 
the intrinsic value of the options at the grant date must be amortized over the option vesting 
period. Therefore, firms that favoured compensation in the form of not-in-the-money stock 
options (or that least that were reported to be not-in-the-money) over cash remuneration reported 
higher book income.   
 
In 1995, the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued a statement encouraging 
but not requiring companies to use the fair value method.  The fair value method requires that 
stock options be expensed based on their fair market value at the time of issuance (and amortized 
over the vesting period) even if the options are not-in-the-money.  Option pricing models, such 
as a modified Black-Scholes model, can be used to determine the fair market value of options on 
their grant date.  A similar non-mandatory move was made by the Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (CICA) in late 2001.  However, in the period following corporate 
scandals such as Enron, both Canada and the U.S. have made the fair value method mandatory.  
In Canada, firms have been required to use the fair value method for financial periods beginning 
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on or after January 1, 2004
40
 while the U.S. rule applies for financial periods beginning on or 
after June 15, 2005.
41
   
 
5. Economic Modeling of Backdating in Canada 
 
5.1 Difficulties Measuring Backdating in Canada 
 
Although Canadian publicly traded companies have not yet been implicated in the backdating 
scandal that has been unfolding in the U.S., this lack of intense scrutiny should not be interpreted 
as reflecting a limited or non-existent presence and prevalence of backdating in Canada.   While 
the institutional context in Canada does differ from that found in the U.S., it is not clear that 
these differences make it less likely that Canadian firms have engaged in questionable options 
timing behaviour.  Indeed, since it is often argued that the corporate traditions in both countries 
are similar and that there is some evidence of a common North American labour market for 
senior corporate executives,
42
 it is naive to assume that Canada is invulnerable to the practice of 
timing option awards.   
 
While significant empirical research has been done on backdating in the U.S., there has been no 
empirical work on this subject published in Canada. The primary reason for this dearth of 
research in Canada can be attributed to the differences in the availability of empirical data 
necessary to examine backdating in the U.S. and Canada.   
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Unlike in the U.S., there is no database detailing insider stock option grants for publicly traded 
companies in Canada.  In the U.S., this information can be readily and easily accessed by 
researchers.  For example, both the Thomson Financial Insider Filing and Standard & Poor‘s 
ExecuComp databases provide access to the information in documents that are filed daily with 
the SEC, including stock option awards.  These SEC filings are compiled and heavily scrutinized 
by associated analysts with the database providers prior to their incorporation into the database.  
In Canada, no such database exists that is readily and costlessly accessible by academic 
researchers.  Instead, researchers must compile and scrutinize the information for each company 
of interest themselves.  Executive option grants post-June 2003 can be obtained online via SEDI.  
While SEDI is freely accessible, it is not readily useable, must be accessed on a company-by-
company basis, and the filings have to be verified for accuracy by the researcher.  Complete 
historical data (i.e., pre-SEDI data) is available only through the relevant provincial securities 
commissions (de facto the Ontario Securities Commission).  The main source of pre-SEDI data 
is the weekly Ontario Securities Commission Bulletin (OSCB).  However, and ignoring the time 
cost associated with such an endeavour, the OSCB excludes one crucial piece of information, 
namely the option filing date.  The filing date along with the other relevant information can be 
obtained directly from the OSC but this is a costly and time-consuming endeavour.
43
 And 
because the data when provided is in the form of photocopies, it must be entered manually into a 
statistics program in order to analyse it.  Finally, because the OSC does not ―vet‖ the filings 
before they are accepted, the accuracy of the data is not guaranteed. Therefore there is a 
significant upfront cost in terms of both money and time for Canadian researchers relative to 
their U.S. counterparts where data is more readily available.   
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It is possible in Canada to obtain some historical information on stock option awards for the 
CEO and the top four highly paid executives.  Since 1993, all publicly listed companies must 
disclose the compensation details of these five executives in their annual proxy statements to 
shareholders.  Beginning in 1997, electronic access to the annual proxy statements has been 
available through the System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR).  Again, 
there still exists a substantial time cost associated with collecting and screening this data.  Like 
the data in the OSCB, SEDAR data excludes information on the filing date.  Further, the proxy 
filings often only include information on the expiration date of the option award and the grant 
date can only be imputed from the expiration date, the exercise price, and information regarding 
the granting, pricing, and vesting practices from the company‘s stock option plan. 
 
A second obvious difference pertains to the sample size available. For instance, the seminal 
study by Lie
44
 is based on a sample of approximately 6,000 CEO option grants over the 1992 to 
2002 period taken from the Standard and Poor‘s ExecuComp database. Another noteworthy 
study by Narayanan and Seyhun consists of a sample of nearly 640,000 option grants over the 
2002 to 2004 period obtained through Thomson Financial.
45
 Sample size clearly is not an issue 
for these researchers. For Canada, the obvious companies to consider would be those trading on 
the TSX 60 or TSX Composite. Whether studying the 60 companies on the TSX 60 or the close 
to 300 on the TSX Composite, sample size (and importantly statistical significance) becomes a 
problem very quickly, especially if the desire is to consider only grants to the CEO (as Lie does 
in his 2005 study). Further, splitting the sample into industry categories and other subsamples (as 
is common in U.S. studies) to see how backdating may differ by industry, firm size, age of firm, 
is difficult with the small sample available in Canada. 
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A final point relates to data quality. Focusing on the data available in the electronic SEDI system 
and comparing this with information from the compensation details reported in the annual proxy 
statements to shareholders as well as other company reports, there is often conflicting filing 
information for a particular grant.  Under the electronic SEDI system, the responsibility for filing 
insider reports rests with the individual receiving the option grant. As a result, it is quite common 
to see filings long after the 10-day reporting window has expired (and at times not reported at 
all), as well as a wide range of missing information (such as strike price, grant date, etc.). These 
data quality issues make statistical analysis difficult and time intensive (as it is often necessary to 
examine other SEDAR or company reports to verify and correct the information provided in 
SEDI). While the accuracy of data can be an issue in the U.S., because of the large sample size 
available, U.S. researchers can simply discard observations that lack clear grant data.
46
 Canadian 
researchers do not have this luxury.  
 
5.2 A Canadian Example of Statistical and Economic Analysis of Backdating 
 
Despite the lack of tangible proof of backdating in Canada, a number of Canadian companies 
have voluntarily and proactively, albeit quietly, launched internal reviews of their options 
granting procedures.  As far as the authors are aware, only two companies have publicly 
announced that they have reviewed their option dating practices and released information 
resulting from these reviews.  In this section we examine one of these companies, FirstService 
Corporation, to determine whether ―economic‖ or ―statistical‖ modelling can demonstrate the use 
of hindsight.
47
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In a press release announcing its 2007 third quarter results dated January 29, 2008, and further 
elaborated in its 2008 Annual Report, FirstService Corporation announced that: 
 
Following receipt of an inquiry from its primary securities regulator, the Company‘s senior 
management and Board of Directors conducted a comprehensive review of historical stock option 
granting processes and the related accounting for the 13 year period from 1995 to 2007. In this 
regard, the Board established a Special Committee of independent directors to complete the 
review and make recommendations to the Board.48   
 
The Special Committee found that, while FirstService‘s stock option plan stipulated that stock 
option grants be priced at no less than their stock‘s TSX closing price on the effective date of the 
grant, company management had been using the lowest monthly trading price (on either the TSX 
or NASDAQ) of the month preceding the grant to determine the effective grant date. The special 
committee concluded that this practice was due to ―…misapprehension by management as to the 
scope of permissible grant dates under our stock option plans…[and] was applied consistently 
throughout the relevant period and was not used selectively to benefit any one group or 
individual.‖49  The company subsequently took a one-time $3.3 million non-material and non-
cash incremental compensation expense, and has approved a number of related remedial 
actions.
50
 
 
The public admission of FirstService to using hindsight to select option grant dates – specifically 
tying the grant date to the lowest trading price in the month preceding the actual grant – provides 
an excellent opportunity to determine whether economic or statistical modelling demonstrates 
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the use of hindsight that the corporation has admitted. This specific case provides a systematic 
way of collecting data, analyzing the information, and reporting the results where the outcome is 
known a priori.  In addition, a case study of this nature can be informative for future research. 
 
In order to undertake this examination, information related to FirstService executive stock option 
grants for the period from January 1, 1997 to December 31, 2006 was compiled from 
information contained in weekly OSC Bulletins, the annual proxy statements to shareholders 
available from the SEDAR system, and filings of stock option grants as well as exercises from 
the SEDI System.
51
  As FirstService options are exercisable for a period of five years from the 
date of issue, the grant date can be imputed by matching the reported strike price to the value of 
the stock five years prior to the noted expiration date for the exercised option.  We obtain an 
initial sample of 96 option awards to individual insiders over our sample period.   
 
Before we proceed, it is essential to scrutinize the reported information for accuracy and we find 
some anomalies.  First, while all insiders are required to file stock option awards with the OSC, 
we found incidences of option awards reported in the annual proxy statements that were not 
reported in the OSC Bulletins or in the SEDI system.  We also find information related to 
exercises that do not have an associated option award reported in the OSC Bulletins or the SEDI 
system.  Second, we found several cases where the information pertaining to specific grants 
varies between information sources.  We use information pertaining to identical grants to other 
insiders as well as the underlying stock price information to attempt to infer the accurate 
information for our purposes.  Third, FirstService shares trade on both the TSX and NASDAQ 
and insiders are supposed to indicate when the option is priced in USD; however, the USD 
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currency note is not always reported in the OSC Bulletins or SEDI System.  Only by checking 
both stock series as well as historical awards to the noted insiders are we able to deduce the 
currency in which the option was priced.  Fourth, we found several cases where we are unable to 
match the recorded grant date and exercise price with the underlying stock price.  In some 
instances, the stock price matches the exercise price within a day of the reported grant date and 
we infer that the accurate grant date is the one where the exercise price matches the stock price.  
However, in a select number of cases, at no point during the reported grant month does the stock 
trade at the reported exercise price.  In some cases, the discrepancy between the stated exercise 
price and the underlying stock price represents mere pennies and we assume that this result is 
driven by errors in our stock data and assume that the reported grant date is correct.  In other 
cases where the discrepancy is larger, we eliminate the options from our sample because we are 
unsure of the accuracy of the grant date.
52
  Last, we found several cases in the later part of the 
sample where the original SEDI filing is accurate, but more than two years after the original 
grant was filed, an amendment was filed by some insiders that repriced the option with a new 
exercise price that placed the grant well in-the-money.  Since the stock was trading well above 
the exercise price on the date that the amendment was filed and no stock split is reported, we 
assume the amendment is erroneous and use the original filing information for our analysis.  
After eliminating options for which the associated information may be inaccurate, we are left 
with a sample of 86 option awards to individual insiders over our sample period.  These 86 
option grants represent 26 separate option granting incidences over the sample period of January 
1, 1997 to December 31, 2006.
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In examining the stock performance of this company around the 26 separate option grant 
incidences, 69% (18) of the awards have an exercise price associated with the lowest price in the 
month prior to the option grant.  Further, one additional award has an exercise price that is 
associated with the second lowest price in the month and three additional awards are associated 
with the third lowest price in the month (in both cases, the differences between the lowest and 
second lowest or third lowest price is pennies). 
 
Assuming no prior information on the granting behaviour of the company, we would use 
statistical modeling to determine whether this was simply a case of very good luck. Therefore we 
consider the probability of this option pricing pattern being random by considering the odds of 
each option being priced at a monthly low.  If we assume that the probability of hitting the 
lowest closing price at random is equal amongst all trading days in a month, then the probability 
is just one divided by the number of trading days in the month of interest.  In particular, if there 
is an average of 20 trading days in any given month, then the probability of getting the low price 
in a month is 1/20 or 5%.  These are quite low probabilities and hence there is a relatively low 
probability that even a single option will hit a low in the window.    
 
We then consider the probability of the company repeatedly hitting a local low.  To do so, we 
can use a formula based on the binomial distribution, assuming that the probability of ―success‖ 
is 5%, as discussed in the preceding paragraph.
53
  As noted above, we find that 18 of the 26 
options hit the monthly low. The probability associated with exactly one of the 26 options hitting 
a monthly low is 36%. Hence it is probable that, from time to time, an option will randomly be 
priced at the lowest price of the month.  However, the probability of at least 18 of the 26 options 
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being priced randomly at the lowest price of the month is approximately 1 in 247 quadrillion, 
which is statistically insignificantly different from 0%.  To put this in perspective, the probability 
that even just five of the 26 options are priced to accord with the monthly low of the stock price 
is less than 1%. 
 
Finally, we can also examine the behaviour of the cumulative raw stock returns around the 
options‘ grant dates to see if they exhibit any abnormal patterns which might hint at option 
timing or manipulation.  Following our discussion in Section 2, we examine a filing window of 
ten days before to ten days after the grant of options, considering the stock returns over that 
period.  It would be an arduous task to determine option timing behaviour by examining event 
windows for each and every executive option granted in our sample; therefore, an aggregated 
level of examination is needed. To examine the cumulative stock returns surrounding a grant 
date for a particular grant g, we calculate the cumulative raw returns as: 
 
CRg =  
10
10
)(
t t
r       (1) 
 
where rt is the daily raw return for FirstService on day t, and we cumulatively sum these returns 
from 10 trading days prior to the executive stock option grant to 10 trading days following the 
grant. In order to draw more overall inferences, we aggregate the period-by-period cumulative 
returns for all the grants in order to provide the mean cumulative returns. 
 
Figure 2 displays the average cumulative raw returns around a twenty-one trading day option 
grant window for all of the options in our sample; that is, the average daily cumulative stock 
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return from 10 trading days prior to 10 trading days following each aggregate option award 
averaged for our entire sample of stock option awards. The graph displays aggregate findings 
which provide suggestive evidence that in the dates surrounding an executive option grant, 
returns are on average low or negative before the grant and high after.  This recognizable trough 
or v-shape could be an indication of backdating, although proving egregious backdating is 
difficult.   
 
In sum, it appears the use of an economic or statistical model to identify possible backdating 
behaviour works quite well. Examining the number of times an option was granted on a monthly 
low, we see that statistically speaking (1 in 247 quadrillion), chalking this up to good luck is 
unlikely. Further, investigating the cumulative returns surrounding option grants we again see the 
tell-tale ―v pattern‖ commonly found in backdating studies. While these results are not surprising 
given the public announcement by FirstService of their historical option granting practices, the 
results do highlight the ability of the statistical and economic models to demonstrate behaviour 
consistent with irregularities in option granting activities. 
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Figure 2: FirstService Cumulative Stock Returns Surrounding Grant Dates
 
 
 
6. Implications of Backdating 
 
There are a number of implications for those caught backdating. In particular, backdating 
violates stock exchange requirements, securities regulations, leads to misstated and/or falsified 
corporate documents such as financial statements, and creates severe and adverse tax 
consequences to employees (whether they were aware of the backdating or not).  We detail some 
of the implications in this section.   
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6.1 Tax Implications  
 
Should TSX companies engage in backdating, a number of issues have bearing beyond the 
company itself. Consider again, the tax issues surrounding backdating by a publicly traded 
company set out in section 4.2.  Both the deduction of one-half of the stock option benefit under 
paragraph 110(1)(d) and the deferral of the inclusion of the stock option benefit until the year 
that the shares are sold (rather than the year the options are exercised) require that the stock 
option be granted not-in-the-money.   
 
If options are granted in-the-money, the executive must include in employment income the full 
amount of the stock option benefit in the year the option is exercised without any offsetting 
deduction.  Thus, employees who receive backdated stock options – the equivalent of an in-the-
money option assuming that the fair market value of the shares on the real grant date exceeds the 
strike price under the option – may be reassessed by the Canada Revenue Agency not only to 
deny any deduction claimed under paragraph 110(1)(d) but also to include the income in an 
earlier year than that in which the employee reported the benefit (and offsetting deduction) for 
tax purposes.  Such reassessment would also include interest, compounded daily at a relatively 
high rate.  Furthermore, an employee who knowingly received backdated options and reported 
them as if they were not-in-the-money could be subject to gross negligence penalties and perhaps 
even be charged with tax evasion. 
 
Consider the following example.  A corporation (X Co.) grants an employee options to acquire 
10,000 common shares at $10 per share, which is the trading price of the shares on Day 1.  
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However, the options are in fact granted a few days later (say on Day 10) when the trading price 
per share is $11, but are backdated to appear as if they were granted on Day 1.  The employee 
exercises the options a few years later (year 4), when the trading price is $22 per share.  The 
employee sells the shares two years after that (year 6) for $28 per share.  The employee reports 
the tax consequences (knowingly or perhaps innocently) on the basis that the options were 
granted not-in-the-money.  Because the total value of the shares that could be acquired under the 
options originally granted (that is, purportedly granted) was $100,000, the employee does not 
report any stock option benefit until the shares are sold (year 6).  In that year, the employee 
includes in employment income a stock option benefit of $120,000,
54
 a deduction under 
paragraph 110(1)(d) of $60,000,
55
 as well as a taxable capital gain of $30,000.
56
  In total, the 
taxpayer would include $90,000 in taxable income in year 6 as a consequence of these 
transactions.  However, because the stock options were in fact granted in-the-money (because the 
value of the shares on the actual grant date ($11) exceeded the strike price under the option 
($10)), the employee must include the full amount of the stock option benefit ($120,000) in 
income in year 4 rather than year 6.  In year 6, the employee should have reported only the 
$30,000 taxable capital gain.  Not only is the employee‘s aggregate taxable income increased by 
$60,000 in years 4 and 6 combined, the $120,000 included in income in year 4 would also 
generate a substantial additional interest expense from April 30 of that year to the date of the 
reassessment.  Although the taxpayer‘s reported income in year 6 would be reduced (from 
$90,000 to $30,000) and the refund owing to the taxpayer for excess taxes paid that year would 
also include interest, such interest is computed at a lower rate (2 percentage points lower) than 
the interest charged pursuant to the year 4 reassessment.   
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6.2 Accounting Implications 
 
Beyond the tax implications to the employee, there are important accounting implications to the 
employer if found backdating, as any company that has backdated stock options may be required 
to restate its earnings (if it is a material amount) in order to properly reflect the compensation 
expense resulting from the in-the-money portion of the options.  This may involve restating 
earnings over past years and may result in a significant reduction in past earnings. To give a 
sense of the magnitude of these restatements, consider the amounts of the restatements by a 
number of companies investigated for backdating. As noted in section 5, FirstService took a one-
time $3.3 million non-material and non-cash incremental compensation expense as a 
consequence of its backdating.  This amount pales in comparison to the substantial restatements 
of reported income that numerous U.S. corporations have been forced to make due to 
inappropriate option pricing practices.
57
  
 
Obviously for shareholders these restatements represent a significant concern, and cost, as it is 
reasonable to expect the stock market to react negatively to these reductions to earnings and 
associated reputational loss surrounding the revelation of backdating by the corporation.
58
   
Indeed, it has been estimated that the revelation of backdating results in an average loss to 
shareholders of $500 million per firm whereas the benefit to corporate managers from 
backdating is no more than $3 million over a 5-year period.
59
  It is not surprising, therefore, that 
backdating exposes a company to potential law suits from shareholders who consider themselves 
harmed as a result.
60
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6.3 Securities Regulations 
 
Backdating also raises issues relating to adherence to Canadian exchange regulations and 
securities law. As discussed earlier, backdating is equivalent to granting in-the-money options, 
and for companies listed on the TSX, this is a clear violation of the exchange‘s rules. By 
misrepresenting the actual grant date of the options, companies could also breach Canadian 
securities laws in terms of misleading public disclosure.
61
  Further, by violating exchange and 
legal requirements, companies may be subject to significant negative reaction by financial 
markets, and as a result, a potential reduction in shareholder value.  In sum, backdating may have 
negative ramifications for investor confidence in those companies implicated for backdating and 
option manipulation. 
 
 
7. Suggestions for Reform 
 
This paper has not attempted to provide an exhaustive examination of backdating in Canada. 
Significantly more empirical data would have to be collected and analyzed for such an 
endeavour. Rather, our intent is to provide an overview of what backdating is, why we should 
care, and some of the implications of backdating, as well as providing one Canadian empirical 
example. Given the ongoing investigations involving Canadian companies, an obvious question 
is what can be done to reduce this practice? From our review of the current state of affairs in 
Canada, as well as that south of the border, a number of policy options are worth considering.   
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i. Reduce the reporting window to match that in the U.S. post Sarbanes-Oxley 
 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted in 2002, amended SEC reporting regulations which now 
require the grant holder to report grants to the SEC within two business days of receiving the 
grant.  A recent study by Heron and Lie
62
 shows that with the introduction of this new two-day 
reporting period, the return pattern associated with backdating is much weaker, while another 
study by the same authors
63
 shows the percent of unscheduled grants backdated or manipulated 
fell dramatically following the introduction of the two-day rule. The move to a two-day rule 
obviously provides a much smaller window to opportunistically backdate option grants and still 
meet the reporting requirements. Given these findings, a move by Canadian regulators to enact a 
similar two-day rule may have similar effects. 
 
On December 18, 2008, the Canadian Securities Administration issued proposed National 
Instrument 55-104.
64
  Among other things, it proposes to reduce the number of insiders required 
to file insider reports, reduce the reporting window from ten days to five days and (discussed 
further below), give issuers the option to file reports on stock-based compensation of insiders.  
The proposed reduction in the reporting window should have a similar impact on the ability to 
manipulate stock option grants in Canada, although not necessarily to the same extent as a two-
day window in the U.S. 
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ii. Require an immediate public press release the day of the grant.  
 
An alternative to following the U.S. lead is to consider a practice currently in place for 
companies listed on the TSX Venture exchange. TSX-V listed companies granting executive 
stock options must issue a public press release on the day of the option grant. Through this 
requirement – assuming that there are (or the threat of) sufficiently severe consequences in the 
event of a failure to comply – the ability to backdate should be eliminated completely and at a 
relatively low cost in terms of resources. 
 
iii. Remove individual responsibility for filing and make it a company responsibility. 
 
Currently, under the SEDI system, the responsibility for filing insider reports rests with the 
executive receiving the option grant. As a result, it is quite common to see filings long after the 
10-day reporting window has expired, as well as a wide range of missing information. This non-
uniformity in data entry reduces transparency and potentially allows for greater opportunity for 
filing misconduct. Moving this responsibility from the individual to the corporation should serve 
to increase uniformity and timeliness of filing.  In either case, the consequences (e.g., penalties) 
attached to a failure to comply must be sufficiently meaningful to promote compliance.  
 
As noted above, proposed National Instrument 55-104 gives reporting issuers the option to file 
stock-based compensation reports for insiders.  Section 6.2 exempts insiders from the insider 
reporting requirement if: 
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(a) the reporting issuer has previously disclosed the existence and material terms of the 
compensation arrangement in an information circular or other public document filed on SEDAR; 
(b) the reporting issuer has previously filed in respect of the acquisition an issuer grant report on 
SEDAR in accordance with section 6.3; and 
(c) the director or officer complies with the alternative reporting requirement in section 6.4.    
 
Under the ―alternative reporting requirement‖ in section 6.4 of proposed National Instrument 55-
104, the insider must file an annual report (within 90 days of the end of the year) disclosing on a 
transaction-by-transaction basis each of acquisition securities (which would include options).
65
 
 
While this proposal is better than the status quo, in our view it does not go far enough in the case 
of stock option grants.  The reporting requirement should rest in the first instance on the 
corporation, which possesses all of the information concerning the grant of stock options to 
insiders and therefore is better placed to ensure that all such grants are reported on a timely and 
accurate basis.  Reporting issuers should not have the option of filing such reports; it should be 
mandatory (and accompanied by sufficiently severe monetary penalties for failure to comply). 
 
iv. Examine the cost attached to late filing of SEDI filings. 
 
Two related concerns that immediately arise when examining SEDI insider filings are the 
punishment for not filing within the 10-day window and whether the punishment is enforced. It 
is our understanding that currently, late reporting (if it is noticed by the regulators) results in a 
fine of $50 per day up to a maximum of $1,000 per firm. This does not appear, at least to us, as a 
terribly biting punishment even if more rigorously enforced. Regulators may want to reconsider 
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their current practice and whether increasing the costs of late filing could influence the decision 
whether or not to backdate.  
 
v. Consider board-management separation and issues arising from a seemingly non-arm’s 
length relationship. 
 
Clearly a much larger task centres on the current manner in which executive stock options are 
awarded. There is a large body of literature concerning the potential for conflict of interest and 
opportunism with the granting of options, and executive compensation generally, due to the close 
relationship between compensation committees and executives.
66
 Increasing the arm‘s-length 
relationship between the board of directors and senior management, and reconsidering how 
compensation committees are structured are two areas that clearly require addressing because the 
close relationship provides fertile ground for practices such as backdating to occur.
67
 We offer no 
simple solutions to this problem, but clearly the problem is a glaring one and extends well 
beyond the problem of stock option backdating.  Other than changes to compensation committee 
structure, other corporate governance options could be considered, including the outright 
elimination of equity-based compensation for senior executives or at least the elimination of non-
scheduled option grants (where there is the greatest potential to manipulate dates). 
 
vi. Eliminate the preferential tax treatment of employee stock options 
 
Some commentators suggest that employee stock options are a poor – indeed perverse – form of 
executive compensation.
68
  The preferential tax treatment of options only exacerbates this 
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problem. The preferential tax treatment of employee stock options – specifically the deduction 
permitted under paragraph 110(1)(d) of the Income Tax Act – may contribute to backdating.  
Since the tax preference requires as a precondition that the options be granted not-in-the-money, 
it stands to reason that the elimination of the tax preference could reduce the propensity to 
backdate. 
 
If the deduction under paragraph 110(1)(d) is eliminated, the question remains as to when the tax 
benefit from stock options should be reported and whether the employer should be permitted an 
offsetting deduction.  In our view, it would be inappropriate for the tax treatment of options to 
match the current accounting treatment.  Specifically, since employment income is taxed on a 
received rather than earned basis, an employee should not be required to include an amount in 
income prior to having an unconditional legal right to exercise the options:  that is, when the 
options vest.  In our view, option pricing models are now sufficiently robust that they can 
determine an option‘s value at that time with a reasonable degree of accuracy.  However, if it is 
considered too difficult to value options at that time, then they should be taxed at the earlier of 
exercise or sale (which is the earliest point in time that they are currently taxed under the Act).  
The employer should be also entitled to a deduction in the same amount at that time.
69
   
 
vii. Permit backdating, or permit in-the-money options (with shareholder approval) 
 
A more radical suggestion is to permit corporations to (or not prohibit them from) granting 
options that are in-the-money.  In principle, there is no reason why corporations should not be 
able to pay employees in whatever manner they see fit provided that shareholders pre-approve 
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the use of such compensation and appropriate corporate governance protection is in place.  
Shareholders could, if they wish, impose restrictions in such plans.  They could outright prohibit 
in-the-money options, or impose limits on their use.
70
  For publicly-listed companies, this 
proposal obviously requires changes to the TSX rules.    
 
There is a need for further academic research on backdating in the Canadian context. No study 
has been done on the extent to which backdating exists in Canada, as has been done in the U.S.
71
 
Is backdating a wide problem in Canadian financial markets or is it relegated to only a handful of 
companies? Further, we believe investigating backdating in Canada will provide results useful 
not only for Canada, but also for those interested in U.S. backdating.  Comparing backdating in 
Canada with that in the U.S. may prove useful in determining the relative importance of tax, 
accounting and securities regulation in option backdating. The rules in these three areas 
governing the treatment of stock options are substantially similar in Canada and the U.S., 
although the rules have changed at different times.  By investigating whether the amount of 
backdating has been affected by various ―trigger‖ dates (i.e., dates of significant changes to tax 
laws, accounting rules and securities regulation relating to stock options), we can provide 
important insights for Canada and the U.S. as to the possible causes of backdating, as well as 
opportunities for reform.  
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benefit for which a deduction under paragraph 110(1)(d) is permitted provided the requirements of that provision are 
met. 
38 ―Performance based‖ options are options that may be exercised only if certain performance targets – such as the 
share price reaching a target amount or the corporation out-performing certain industry benchmarks – are met.  
39 See note 9 for exceptions to this rule.  In the U.S., this approach was originally enshrined in Accounting Principles 
Board, Opinion no. 25, ―Accounting for Stock Issued to Employees,‖ October 1972 (―APB 25‖).  APB 25 required 
variable accounting in certain circumstances.  There was no equivalent to APB 25 in Canada and, other than note 
disclosure, companies in Canada virtually never recorded a compensation expense for employee stock options under 
any circumstances. 
40 CICA Handbook, Section 3870. 
41 FAS 123R. 
42 See C. Southam and S.  Sapp, ―Comparing CEO compensation between neighbors: What can we learn from cross-
listed firms?‖ (January 2008), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=869868. 
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43 The OSC charges a $150 purchase fee per company and a photocopying charge of $0.50 per page and it can be 
months before the information is provided. 
44 Supra, note 11. 
45 Narayanan and Seyhun, (2008), supra note 12.  The much larger sample size for Narayanan and Seyhun reflects 
the fact that their sample is based on all insider option grants by all publicly traded companies, while Lie‘s sample is 
based only on CEO option grants of 2,000 large firms and is pared down from a larger sample of near 11,000. 
46 Users of the Thomson Financial Insider Filing Database are also provided with a cleanse indicator which details 
how clean or high quality a particular observation is. See Heron and Lie (2007, Forthcoming), supra note 12. 
47 Our definition of backdating for these purposes is simply the use of hindsight to determine the effective grant date 
and price. We are not testing, nor implying, the broader definition of backdating commonly seen in the literature 
which includes activities such as altering of legal documents, or other wrongdoings. 
48 FirstService Corporation, January 29, 2008 Press Release, at 4; retrieved July 7, 2008, from 
http://www.firstservice.com/investors/newsroom/pdf/Q3_F2008_earnings_release_final_29Jan08.pdf. 
49 FirstService Corporation, Annual Report 2008; retrieved July 7, 2008, from 
http://www.firstservice.com/investors/annual_reports/pdf/Annual_2008.pdf 
50 Interested readers are directed to FirstService‘s 2008 Annual Report, ibid., which discusses the findings of the 
special committee and the resulting actions in greater detail.    
51 We obtain the daily stock price information (open, high, low, close, and adjusted close) for FirstService from 
Yahoo Finance.  As the series obtained contains numerous missing observations from the period prior to January 1, 
1997, we are unable to examine stock option grants prior to this date. 
52 In all such cases, the option appears to have been granted in-the-money. 
53 The binomial distribution considers that case of a repeated random experiment where each trial within the 
experiment has two possible outcomes and each trial is independent. 
54 [$22 (fair market value of the shares at the time of exercise) – $10 (strike price)] x 10,000. 
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55 One-half of the stock option benefit of $120,000. 
56 One-half of the capital gain:  [$28 (sale price per share) – $22 (cost per share, equal to the strike price under the 
option)] x 10,000. 
57 The Wall Street Journal periodically updates its ―Options Scorecard‖, which tracks companies that have come 
under scrutiny for past stock-option grants:  see http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-
optionsscore06-full.html.  The Scorecard includes a column indicating those companies that have had to restate 
earnings, the amount of which is often set out in the ―comments‖ column. 
58 See G. Bernile and G.A. Jarrell, ―The Impact of the Options Backdating Scandal on Shareholders‖ (Forthcoming) 
Journal of Accounting and Economics. 
59 Narayanan, Schipani and Seyhun, supra note 12. 
60 Class action law suits have been commenced against a number of companies in the U.S. as a consequence of 
option pricing practices. Interested readers are directed to http://dandodiary.blogspot.com/2006/07/counting-options-
backdating-lawsuits.html which provides a running tally of U.S. law suits for option pricing practices. A recent 
report, Do Options Backdating Class Actions Settle for Less? by NERA, provides interesting findings on the lower 
than expected settlements for backdating-related shareholder class action lawsuits relative to other comparable non-
backdating related class action settlements. This report can be found at  
http://www.nera.com/image/PUB_Backdating_PartIV_0608.pdf 
61 Securities legislation subjects reporting issuers to continuous disclosure requirements.  These include annual 
financial statements and a statement of executive compensation (included as part of the management information 
circular):  see National Instrument 51-102, sections 4.1 (re annual financial statements) and 9.3.1 (regarding the 
statement of executive compensation).  Backdated stock options misrepresent the true value of compensation 
provided to executives and, if such misrepresentations are material, would constitute a breach of the reporting 
issuer‘s continuous disclosure requirements.  
62 Heron and Lie (2007), supra note 12. 
63 Heron and Lie (Forthcoming), supra note 12. 
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64 The draft National Instrument is available from the Ontario Securities Commission website, 
http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part5/csa_20081218_55-104_roc-insider-rpt.pdf. 
65 If the insider disposes of securities during the year, he or she must file the alternative report within five days of 
such disposition. 
66 See, for example, Yermack, supra note 19; and Chauvin and Shenoy, supra note 20. 
67 For example, some companies have openly admitted that executives play a large part in structuring their own 
compensation with compensation committees serving only to ratify the plans, while others have their own CEOs on 
the compensation committee: Yermack, supra note 19 at 453. 
68 See, e.g., C.A. Johnson, ―Stock and Stock Option Compensation:  A Bad Idea‖ (2003) vol. 51, no. 3 Canadian 
Tax Journal 1259-1290.  
69 See further, D. Sandler, ―The Benchmark Income Tax Treatment of Employee Stock Options:  A Basis for 
Comparison‖ (2003) vol. 51, no. 3 Canadian Tax Journal 1204-1229. 
70 For example, they could adopt limits similar to those imposed by the TSX-V, supra note 27. 
71 Supra notes 11 and 12.  
